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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
HUGER SINKLER*
The Validity of the South Carolina Fair-Trade Act as Applied
to a Non-signer of a Price-fixing Contract
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Electric Co.' involves the
validity of the South Carolina Fair-Trade Act, 2 as applied to
non-signers of agreements between the manufacturer and his
distributors regulating retail prices.
Although such a statute was at one time proscribed by a
federal statute3 which had been enacted pursuant to the third
clause of Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion,4 the Miller-Tydings Act,5 as afterwards implemented by
the McGuire Act,6 specifically provides that such agreements
shall not be illegal if the same would be lawful as applied to
instrastate transactions under local law. Thus the question
of the validity or invalidity of a state fair-trade act is now
to be determined solely by an interpretation of the applicable
State Constitution.
The plaintiff here was not one of the dealers or distributors
in South Carolina who had bound themselves by written con-
tract with the manufacturer to maintain a fixed schedule
of retail prices. Presumably, the plaintiff had lawfully ac-
quired General Electric products from others than the Gen-
eral Electric Company, and there was no contract or covenant
in existence by which General Electric Company might claim
that the plaintiff had obligated itself to follow any schedule
of retail prices.
The South Carolina Fair-Trade Act provides that, if there
is in existence a contract relating to a commodity which bears
the name of the producer of such commodity, which, among
*Member of firm of Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston; B.A., 1927,
College of Charleston; legal education, 1929, University of South Caro-
lina; member City Council of Charleston, 1939-43; member State Leg-
islature, 1932-36 and 1945-46; member Charleston County, South Caro-
lina and American Bar Associations.
1. 231 S. C. 636, 99 S. E. 2d 665 (1957).
2. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 66-91 - 66-95, in-
clusive.
3. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
4. The so-called "commerce clause", giving Congress power to reg-
ulate commerce among the several states.
5. 50 STAT. 693 (1937),15 U. S. C. § 1 (1952).
6. 66 STAT. 631, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1952).
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other things, prescribes minimum prices for its resale, it shall
be unlawful for any third party to knowingly offer such com-
modity for sale at a price less than that prescribed by the
contract between the manufacturer and distributor.
Perhaps it should again be emphasized that the decision
here does not concern the validity of the agreement between
the manufacturer and the distributor fixing retail prices. The
case here relates only to the non-signing third party, who,
with full knowledge of the existence of the contract, offers
the product to the public at lower prices than prescribed by
such contract.
Noting that statutes of this sort had their origin in the
great Depression of the early 1930's, our Court first presents
a box score of the holdings of other courts on this question.
It notes that a majority of the courts have upheld state fair-
trade acts, but that a recent trend has become adverse. Our
Court then concludes that as applied to a non-signer, the
South Carolina Fair-Trade Law violates the due process clause
of the State Constitution. Its holding is predicated upon the
proposition that property consists not merely in the owner-
ship and possession of a thing, but in the unrestricted right
of use, enjoyment and, finally, of disposal. It reaffirms the
doctrine that any act which destroys any one or more of these
attributes of property to that extent destroys the property
itself. And it holds that the right of an owner of property
to fix the price at which he will sell, is such an important
attribute of property that to infringe upon this right deprives
its owner of property in the constitutional sense.
Thus our Court allies itself with the modern trend in the
interpretation of state fair-trade acts.
Always of interest is the Court's comment on the analogous
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. That
Court had held that a non-signer would be bound by a price-
fixing agreement, on the theory that the acquisition of the
property came about with knowledge of the existing restric-
tions with respect to its re-sale.7 The holding is premised
on the theory that particular value exists in the brand or
trade-name that accompanies the commodity. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court stated that it was not impressed with
such reasoning.
7. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299
U. S. 183 (1936).
[Vol. 11
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In passing, the South Carolina Court correctly observed
that the only basis upon which legislation of this sort might
be upheld was as a reasonable and proper exercise of the
police power of the state. In other words, for the statute to
be upheld, it would have to be found as a fact that the legisla-
tion was necessary in the interests of public order, health,
safety, morals or general welfare.
Appealing as this holding is, one cannot but wonder what
the result would have been had the attack here been made
at the height of the great Depression. Economic adversity
is ofttimes more persuasive than mere logic.
The Validity of a Special Act Establishing a Single
Special Purpose District
The case of Mills Mill v. Hawkins,s decided in June of
1957, with certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
afterwards denied, is perhaps one of the most interesting
and at the same time important cases relating to the special
act provision of the State Constitution that has been decided
in many years. The case also bristles with other questions
which are of real public interest.
In 1955, the General Assembly passed an act (obviously
special in nature), creating a public corporation known as
the Una Water District of Spartanburg County. The act au-
thorized the governing body of the Water District to acquire,
by construction or otherwise, and to operate, public water
and sewer systems. The act also authorized the governing
body of the District to make provision for the collection and
disposition of garbage. It was contended that the law was
special legislation, and invalid because it violated Subdivision
9 of Section 34 of Article III of the Constitution.9 A second
challenge contended that the act violated the due process
clauses of both State and Federal Constitutions.
Each contention was forcefully made and each question
holds great interest. The case was twice argued, this cir-
cumstance doubtless arising from a division which manifested
itself in a dissenting opinion concurred in by a circuit judge
sitting as Acting Associate Justice. The dissent, evidently
8. 232 S. C. 515, 103 S. E. 2d 14 (1957), cert. denied, - U. S.
- (1958).
9. "IX .... In all other cases, where a general law can be made
applicable, no special law shall be enacted ...."
1958]
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written as the majority opinion, itself requires special atten-
tion.
The chief contention of the plaintiff on the first point was
that the existence of a general law on the subject proved
without doubt that the act was a special law where a general
law could be enacted. The existence of the so-called general
law on the subject of water and sewer districts was one basis
of dissenting Justice Legge's conclusion that the special law
was invalid. And both to justify his holding on this point,
and to distinguish his conclusion from a contrary holding in
an earlier case, 10 he points out that at the time the earlier case
was decided the General Assembly had not spoken, and thus
the field was then one within which special legislation might
be enacted. Since the dissenting opinion appears to misin-
terpret the meaning of Subdivision 9, special comment will
be made on this point. Because too, the dissent can have
serious and adverse effect on the marketing of South Caro-
lina bonds, comment will be made in the unwillingness of
Justice Legge to follow earlier decisions. Finally, the dis-
cussion and holding with respect to the due process question
will prove, in the opinion of the writer, an important legal
milestone. On this point all Justices agreed that one ad-
versely affected by the creation of a special purpose district
might challenge its enactment on the ground that it violated
the due process clause. While the majority concluded that
under the facts of this case, the plaintiff was not arbitrarily
treated and was entitled to no relief, the minority concluded
otherwise. But the result (which seems clearly correct) is
not so important as the holding that the legislative finding
of special benefit might be reviewed by the Court. The fed-
eral rule seems now to be otherwise."
Was the Challenged Act a Special Act Where a
General Law Could, be Enacted?
The majority decision carefully notes that the controlling
question here is not whether there is in existence a general
law on the subject, but whether a general law can be made
applicable. Attention has already been called to the fact that
the dissenting opinion proceeds on the theory that while a
10. Rutledge v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 139 S. C. 188, 137
S. E. 598 (1927).
11. Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 306 U. S.
459 (1939).
[Vol. 11
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special law might be valid if the General Assembly had not
preempted the particular field of general legislation, if the
General Assembly shall have enacted general legislation in a
particular field, all subsequently enacted special legislation
would be invalid. Actually, the Georgia Constitution is so
written, and the wording of the comparable provision of the
Georgia Constitution points up the differences between the
two provisions. The Georgia Constitution provides "no special
law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been
made by an existing general law." In connection with the
meaning of that language, the Georgia Court has said:12
"Under this provision, a general law may be repealed or
modified by another general law, but it cannot be repealed
or modified by a special or local law."
To reach its conclusion that the challenged act did not
constitute a special law where a general law could be enacted,
the majority opinion carefully considered the scope and effect
of the so-called general law. It noted that the general law
did not provide that water and sewer districts might be
created, and it points out that under the general law there
is no assurance that such results will follow in any given
case. The majority reasoned:
EvidenLly the General Assembly concluded that a water
and sewer district covering this area would not be formed
either under the 1929 Act or that of 1934 by voluntary
action on the part of the freeholders and qualified elec-
tors or that the creation of same would be considerably
delayed, and for the protection of the public health im-
mediate State action was necessary. The apparent apathy
on the part of some in this area doubtless led to the
provision in the 1955 Act authorizing the commissioners
to compel the residents to use water and sewer facilities.
We do not think that the effort to remove the unsanitary
conditions prevailing in this territory by special legis-
lation was obnoxious to Article III, Section 34, Sub-
division IX of the Constitution. Under the circumstances,
there was no general law applicable.
The majority opinion goes on to state that as far as the
writer thereof was concerned, the enactment could be sus-
tained by reason of Section 11 of Article VII of the Consti-
12. State Highway Department v. H. G. Hastings Co., 187 Ga. 819, 199
S. E. 793 (1938).
19581
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tution which authorizes special provisions for "municipal
government" in the counties. 13 What the significance of the
language "speaking only for himself" may be, is not entirely
clear. It must be remembered that the prohibition against
special legislation is no ancient, ingrained proposition of con-
stitutional restriction, insofar as South Carolina is concerned.
In none of the earlier South Carolina Constitutions did such
a prohibition exist. It first appears in the Constitution
adopted in 1895. Since it is provided in our present Constitu-
tion that all powers not taken away from the General As-
sembly remain to it, it can be observed that the Constitution
of 1895 would have been far less voluminous had it not been
for the insertion of the special legislation provision.'4
The special act provision of our Constitution is a common
one, insofar as state constitutions are concerned. It is the
provision designed to check the so-called legislative practice
of logrolling, and it results from a basic weakness in the
United States Constitution on that point. That weakness,
coupled with the absence of power in the Executive to veto
specific items in appropriation bills, has long been noted.
Those who wrote the Constitution of the Confederate States
were careful to vest in the Executive the power to control
the public purse by giving- him the right to veto items in
appropriation bills. But at the time the South Carolina Con-
stitution was written, a more serious problem than legisla-
13. Article VIII of the Constitution of 1895 is the Article dealing with
incorporated cities and towns. Article VII of that document is headed:
"Counties and County Government." Section 11 of Article VII reads
in part:
Each of the several townships of this State, with names and
boundaries as now established by law, shall constitute a body politic
and corporate, but this shall not prevent the General Assembly from
organizing other townships or changing the boundaries of those
already established; and the General Assembly may provide such
system of township government as it shall think proper in any and
all the Counties, and may make special provision for municipal
government and for the protection of chartered rights and powers
of municipalities.
There seems good reason to assume that Section 11 of Article VII
was put in after the full effect of Paragraph 9 of Section 34 of Article
III was realized.
14. In a long line of cases the Supreme Court of South Carolina has
held that the prohibition against special laws found in Section 34, of
Article III, has no application if the special law is specifically au-
thorized by any other provision of the Constitution. Cases to this effect
are: State v. Touchberry, 121 S. C. 5, 113 S. E. 345 (1922); Shelor V.
Pace, 151 S. C. 99, 148 S. E. '726 (1929); Anderson v. Page, 208 S. C.
146, '37 S. E. 2d 289 (1946); Moseley v. Welsh, 209 S. C. 19, 39 S. E.
2d 133 (1946) ; Gaud v. Walker, 214 S. C. 451, 53 S. E. 2d 316 (1949).
[Vol. II
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rive logrolling faced its people. The state had barely re-
covered from Reconstruction days, and while white supremacy
had been restored on a state-wide basis, it had not been re-
stored throughout all of the counties of the state. In 1895
there were many counties in which the substantial black ma-
jority remained in political control. The framers of the Con-
stitution intended that the General Assembly protect such
counties. And if they had intended that the counties and their
subdivisions should be governed entirely through the opera-
tion of general laws, it is hard to see how the black ma-
jorities in several of the low-country counties would be cir-
cumvented.
Then too, another reason for Section 11 is apparent. At
the time of the framing of the Constitution the mill village
had come into existence. One reason the mills came to South
Carolina was because it was possible to locate outside of in-
corporated cities and thus be relieved from a part of the
tax burden, then only known in terms of ad valorem taxes.
Nevertheless, the mill village required policing and other
services generally furnished by municipal governments, and
without question this factor was one basis for the inclusion of
Section 11 of Article VII into the Constitution.
A case decided almost contemporaneously with the adopt-
tion of the Constitution, Carolina Grocery Co. v. Burnet,15
has this to say:
... It is no doubt true that the strict application of
the term "municipal" would limit it to incorporated
cities, towns and villages; but it is also true, it may
properly be used in characterizing the government of
a county or township. "Municipal corporations are ad-
ministrative agencies established for the local govern-
ment of towns, cities, counties or other particular dis-
tricts, &c." Black Constitutional Law, p. 374. In 15 A.
& E. Ency. Law, 953, it is stated, "A municipal corpora-
tion in its broader sense is a body politic such as a State
and each of the governmental subdivisions of the State,
such as counties, parishes, townships, hundreds, New
England 'towns,' and school districts, as well as cities
and incorporated towns, villages, and boroughs. Every
one of these is properly susceptible of the general appel-
15. 61 S. C. 205, 39 S. E. 381 (1901).
1958]
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lation." This broad sense seems to have been the one
intended in this particular section, whatever may be said
of its use in other sections or articles; for the article
containing it is devoted, as shown by its title, to "counties
and county government," whereas art. 8 is devoted to
the government of cities and towns. This section was
evidently framed in view of the provisions of art. III,
sec. 34, and was intended to give the legislature a wider
latitude in the making of special provisions for county
and township government.
Stare Decisis in the Field of Public Finance
The majority opinion was eminently correct in recogniz-
ing the importance of stare decisis in the field of public
finance. It noted that there were many instances in which
the legislature had created special-purpose districts and that
there had been many decisions upholding the validity of those
legislative enactments. It pointed out that upon the strength
of those decisions, millions of dollars in bonds have been is-
sued and are outstanding, and it stated that in this field, as
in the case of the law relating to real estate, it is very im-
portant that there be stability and uniformity in our decisions.
The Court said :15a
There may be some foundation for the statement in
one of the briefs that our decisions are not entirely clear
as to the basis upon which it has been held that legisla-
tion creating special purpose districts is not within the
prohibition of Article III, Section 34 of the Constitution.
But the reasoning is not as important as the result.
In the field of public finance stare decisis is even more
important than in the field of the real property law. This is
peculiarly true in South Carolina because of the fact that
the Constitution of 1895 was "amended" on several occasions
by judicial fiat during the 1920's.16
While it is perfectly obvious that the Court as it is now
constituted does not approve of amending written constitu-
tions by judicial fiat, a favorite pastime with the United
States Supreme Court, the fact remains that the State Con-
stitution has been amended in that fashion. Illustrative are
15a. 103 S. E. 2d at 19.
16. 3 S. C. L. Q. 303 (1951). In this article instances of patent disre-
gard for the constitutional limitations on the incurring of public debt
are listed.
[Vol. 11
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holdings which permit the issuance of General Obligation
Bonds of the State of South Carolina without the election
required by the Constitution.1'7 In a recent case,' 8 the writer
of the majority decision here had this to say in a special con-
curring opinion about the proposition that bonds of the State
could be issued without an election:
I do not agree with the interpretation which the Court
there placed upon the foregoing section of the Constitu-
tion, but am bound by that decision. It is too late now
to question the doctrine there established.
That is not the only place where the Constitution of South
Carolina has been amended by judicial fiat. Those who wrote
the State Constitution were very careful to limit the extent
to which debt might be incurred. Not only was there a limi-
tation of 8% imposed against each municipality or subdivision
which issued bonds, but there was also imposed a 15% overall
limitation, so that the aggregate of debt incurred by all who
might have the power to issue bonds should not exceed 15%
of the assessed value of the taxable property upon which ad
valorem taxes were to be levied to pay such debt. But during
the 1920's the 15% limitation was written out of the Con-
stitution in a series of cases discussed in an earlier article in
the South Carolina Law Quarterly. 9 At a later date, in the
case of Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District,20 the
Supreme Court, composed of three Justices now sitting, said:
"The result of these decisions, to which we adhere, was that
the particular subdivisions validly issued and sold bonds."
(Despite the 15 % limitation).
Certainty in the law is the one thing that Anglo-American
jurisprudence seeks. For so long as the law is certain, in-
justice will less frequently occur. The doctrine of stare
decisis rests upon the principle that law by which men are
governed should be fixed, definite, and known; that when
law is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized
to construe it, such a declaration, in the absence of palpable
mistake or error, is itself evidence of the law until changed
by competent authority. The decisions of a court should be
17. These are duly listed in State ex rel. Arthur v. Byrnes, 224 S. C.
51, 77 S. E. 2d 311 (1953).
18. State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S. C. 485, 66 S. E. 2d 33
(1951).
19. 3 S. C. L. Q. 303 (1951).
20. 211 S. C. 77, 44 S. E. 2d 88 (1947).
1958]
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overruled by its successor only under unusual circumstances,
for if that is to happen frequently, the law will have a trans-
ient efficacy which will result in many evils.
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of adhereing to
its former decisions in this particular field, the dissenting
opinion endeavors to carefully differentiate the earlier hold-
ings. It is quite true that in many of those earlier holdings
the reasoning does not suggest itself to praise. It is also
equally frue that were those cases presented as cases of first
impression at this time, a different result would almost surely
follow, but that is beside the point. The situation was that
the questions were raised, they were raised before a tribunal
empowered to decide them, they were decided specifically, and
should remain the law of the State until overruled by legisla-
tive processes.
The Right of the Aggrieved Property-Holder to Challenge
the Legislative Finding of Benefit
The majority holding that special purpose districts may
be created by special acts will probably be sustained against
any subsequent attack. Certainly it can never be argued that
this question was not squarely before the Court. Most as-
suredly it cannot be said that the question was not affirma-
tively resolved. As a consequence, the second question in-
volved may oft arise, viz.: What relief has a property owner
against the inclusion of his property in a special-purpose
district? Has the legislature unlimited power in this respect?
May it create a water district anywhere in South Carolina?
The answer here is No. While of course legislative enact-
ments must be given great weight, the very fact that the
Court entertained the question is proof that it can be raised.
Once again the Court found itself in disagreement as to re-
sult. The majority concluded that the action of the Legisla-
ture in including the property of the complainant was not un-
just or arbitrary, and that its action was valid. The minority
opinion concludes that the action was arbitrary and did de-
prive the plaintiff of its property without process of law.
But the result here is not important. The important thing is
that the question can be raised. How different is the situa-
tion here from that prevailing under the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court! In the early case of Valley
[Vol. 11
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Farms v. Westchester County,2 1 the Supreme Court, in up-
holding the validity of a special-purpose district which in-
cluded lands of the plaintiff which were so situate that they
could never avail themselves of any part of the sewer system
established, and were so isolated as to need no protection
from a health standpoint, the Supreme Court of the United
States made an effort to reconcile an earlier statement that
it was the plain duty of the Court to strike down such legis-
lation, if it found that such legislation was arbitrary and con-
stituted an abuse of power. However, following that decision
is the case of Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control
District.22 There the pronouncement of the United States
Supreme Court is that "where the legislature has created a
drainage, sewer, or other improvement district, and fixed its
areas, the landowners included therein are not entitled to a
hearing on question as to whether their lands will be bene-
fitted. Prior inquiry by the legislative body is presumed, and
its finding is conclusive." That holding had been noted by
our Supreme Court in the case of Sanders v. Greater Green-
ville Sewer District.23 But the Court stated that it was not
called upon to adopt such a doctrine. That action of our
Court proved wise. For, in the light of this case, there now
exists a basis for any property owner, feeling himself hurt
by the inclusion of his property in a special-purpose district,
to attack the validity of the legislative act as an abuse of due
process. The very fact that laws of this sort may be enacted
by special legislation makes it imperative that an opportunity
exists for the property owner to attack the validity of them
as violative of the due process guaranty.
21. 261 U. S. 155 (1923).
22. See note 11 supra.
23. 211 S. C. 141,44 S. E. 2d 185 (1947).
1958]
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